The Blind Leading the Blind:
Who Gets Polling Information and Does it
Improve Decisions?

Cheryl Boudreau
Assistant Professor
University of California, Davis
Department of Political Science
One Shields Avenue
Davis, CA 95616
Phone: (530) 752-8128
clboudreau@ucdavis.edu

Mathew D. McCubbins
Distinguished Professor
University of California, San Diego
Department of Political Science
9500 Gilman Drive, Mail Code 0521
La Jolla, CA 92093-0521
Phone: (858) 534-3733
mmccubbins@ucsd.edu

*We thank the National Science Foundation (Grant #SES-0616904) and the Kavli Institute for
Brain and Mind for providing financial support for these experiments. We are also grateful to
Gary Cox, Bob Huckfeldt, Cindy Kam, Skip Lupia, Scott MacKenzie, Sam Popkin, and
members of the micro-politics group at the University of California, Davis for helpful comments
on this project.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1324318

Abstract
We analyze whether and when polls help citizens to improve their decisions.
Specifically, we use experiments to investigate 1) whether and when citizens are willing to
obtain polls and 2) whether and when polls help citizens to make better choices than they would
have made on their own. We find that citizens are more likely to obtain polls when the decisions
they must make are difficult and when they are unsophisticated. Ironically, when the decisions
are difficult, the pollees are also uninformed and, therefore, do not provide useful information.
We also find that when polls indicate the welfare-improving choice, citizens are able to improve
their decisions. However, when polls indicate a choice that will make citizens worse off, citizens
make worse decisions than they would have made on their own. These results hold regardless of
whether the majority in favor of one option over the other is small or large.
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How do polls affect citizens’ decisions? Ever since polling proliferated in the early 20th
century, citizens in our country have been bombarded with facts and figures regarding what the
“typical” American thinks, feels, and intends to do (Igo 2007; Herbst 1993). For example, when
covering campaigns, the media frequently report poll results indicating the percentage of citizens
who intend to vote for one candidate over the other, the percentage of citizens who think that a
given candidate is qualified, and so on. When discussing policy proposals, the media often
present polls showing the percentage of citizens who support or oppose the policy in question.
Similarly, the media report the results of polls that reflect citizens’ beliefs about factual matters,
such as whether Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction or whether Barack Obama is
a Muslim. Related polls are conducted in economic contexts, where businesses report poll
results showing that a majority of consumers prefer their brand to their competitors’ brands.
Given the countless polls that are conducted and publicized in political and economic
contexts, it is not surprising that scholars question whether and how polls influence citizens.
Although some scholars suggest that polls provide uninformed citizens with cues that may aid
them with their decisions (Popkin 1991; Bartels 1988; Mutz 1992; Key 1966), others argue that
polls may have harmful effects because political elites and the media can manipulate them
(Jacobs and Shapiro 1995-1996; Lippman 1925; Polsby and Wildavsky 1980; West 1991). Such
concerns about polls have been heightened in recent years because of the media’s tendency to
make poll results appear overly precise1 and scientific when in fact many polls are plagued by
inaccuracies and biases (Herbst 1993; Igo 2007; Lau 1994; Franklin 2003; Jackman 2005).
These concerns, viewed in light of research showing that polls influence citizens’ beliefs and
behaviors (e.g., Hardy and Jamieson 2005; Mutz 1997; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994), make it
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important to analyze 1) the conditions under which citizens seek out and use polls and 2) whether
and when polls help citizens to make better decisions than they would have made on their own.
We analyze both of these questions by conducting laboratory experiments. Specifically,
we randomly assign subjects to either a control group (where subjects make their decisions on
their own) or to one of several different treatment groups (where subjects have the option to
receive poll results before making their decisions). Our results show that subjects are more
likely to obtain polls when the decisions they must make are difficult and when they are
unsophisticated. This finding is disturbing given that the difficult decisions are the ones where
1) the pollees typically lack the knowledge to recommend welfare-improving choices and 2)
subjects typically lack the sophistication to judge the accuracy of the pollees’ recommendations.
Our results also show the effects that polls have on the quality of subjects’ decisions.
Specifically, our results demonstrate that when poll results indicate the welfare-improving
choice, subjects who choose to receive them improve their decisions. However, when poll
results indicate an option that will make subjects worse off, subjects are swayed by these polls
and make worse decisions than they would have made on their own. Surprisingly, subjects are
swayed by these polls even when the size of the majority picking one option over the other is not
very large. Taken together, our results demonstrate that when it comes to polls, “the blind lead
the blind.” That is, subjects are more likely to obtain polls when the pollees are least likely to
help them, and they consistently follow the recommendations of small, uninformed majorities.

Do Polls Help or Harm?
In response to scholars who lament citizens’ lack of factual knowledge about politics
(Berelson et al. 1954; Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964), many scholars argue that cues can
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substitute for knowledge about politics and help citizens make informed choices (Popkin 1991;
Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Lupia 1994; Druckman 2001; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991;
Kam 2005). Although there are many cues that citizens can rely upon (party labels,
endorsements, candidates’ appearances, etc.), scholars emphasize that polls are particularly
salient cues for citizens and that they influence citizens’ decisions and perceptions (Popkin 1991;
Kam and Sommer 2006; Bartels 1988; Mutz 1992; Irwin and Van Holsteyn 2002; Ceci and Kain
1982; see Geer 1996 for a discussion of how polls affect politicians). Indeed, given the dramatic
increase in the number of polls reported in the media (Herbst 1993; Lavrakas and Traugott 2000;
Igo 2007), it is not surprising that scholars emphasize the cue-taking aspects of public opinion
poll reporting. Although these scholars suggest that polls can provide citizens with cues, many
do not assess the conditions under which polls improve citizens’ decisions.
In contrast to those who suggest that polls provide citizens with helpful cues, several
scholars argue that polls may have harmful effects. Specifically, scholars in this camp suggest
that political elites and the media can manipulate polls, which may enable them to sway citizens’
preferences and voting decisions (Jacobs and Shapiro 1995-1996; Lippman 1925; Polsby and
Wildavsky 1980; West 1991; Herbst 1993). For example, Jacobs and Shapiro (1995-1996)
demonstrate that President Nixon tried to influence pollsters in order to misrepresent information
about public opinion and enhance his own political power. Similarly, West (1991) emphasizes
that if polls influence citizens’ choices, then this gives tremendous power to elites and the media
who control the dissemination of poll results. Further, Herbst (1993) and Igo (2007) suggest that
modern polls often appear more precise and authoritative than they actually are and that polls
often supplant other types of information about public opinion (such as interviews with activists).
Based upon related fears about the effects of polls, several countries have restricted the

4
publication of opinion polls during campaigns (McAllister and Studlar 1991). Taken together,
this research recognizes that polls may have detrimental effects and underscores the importance
of identifying the conditions under which polls do (and do not) have such effects.
It is this body of research on the effects of polls that we build on in this study.
Specifically, we use experiments to investigate the conditions under which citizens are willing to
obtain polls. We also assess the conditions under which polls help citizens to make better
decisions than they would have made on their own. Although there are many experimental and
survey-based studies of polls, our experiments are unique in that they allow subjects to choose
whether and when they would like to receive polls. This aspect of our experiments is
advantageous because it allows us to observe directly 1) whether and when citizens are willing to
bear the costs of obtaining polls (which often take the form of foregone opportunities to do
something else) and 2) which types of citizens (i.e. unsophisticated versus sophisticated) are
more likely to seek out and use polls. Further, in contrast to many survey-based studies of polls
(where scholars often do not know whether individuals receive particular poll results and must
deal with confounding events that occur during campaigns; see Hardy and Jamieson 2005), our
experiments enable us to isolate the effects that polls alone have on citizens’ decisions and
determine whether polls, by themselves, help citizens to make better decisions than they would
have made on their own.

Research Design
In order to analyze the conditions under which polls help citizens to improve their
decisions, we randomly assign subjects to either a control group or to one of several different
treatment groups. We then ask subjects to answer a series of binary choice math problems (that
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is, subjects may choose whether answer “a” or answer “b” is correct). The math problems are
drawn from an SAT math test and consist of many different types of problems and several levels
of difficulty. We tell subjects in both the treatment and control groups that they have 60 seconds
to answer each math problem2 and that they will earn 50 cents for each problem that they answer
correctly, lose 50 cents for each problem that they answer incorrectly, and neither earn nor lose
50 cents if they leave a problem blank. We ask subjects to make choices about math problems
(instead of asking them to vote for fictional candidates or policies), in part, because this task
provides us with a straightforward way of identifying correct decisions and assessing whether
and when polls induce an improvement in decision making. Stated differently, although it is
often difficult to identify when citizens choose the “correct” candidate or policy,3 it is easy to tell
when they choose the correct answer to a math problem.
The difference between the treatment and control groups has to do with the conditions
under which subjects answer the math problems. In the control group, subjects answer the math
problems on their own, which provides a baseline for how well subjects make these decisions
when they do not have access to polls. In the treatment groups, subjects also answer these math
problems. However, before subjects in the treatment groups make their decisions, they can
choose to receive the results of polls that we conducted prior to the experiment.
Specifically, before running our experiments, we polled 66 college undergraduates about
what they thought the correct answers to the different math problems were. We told these
undergraduates that they could either answer each problem or leave it blank. This aspect of our
design makes our polls analogous to real world polls in which “don’t know” is an option.4 Then,
if the undergraduates that we polled chose to answer a given problem, they could choose either
answer “a” or answer “b.” These undergraduates had 60 seconds to make a decision about each
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math problem,5 and they earned 50 cents each time they chose the correct answer, lost 50 cents
each time they chose the incorrect answer, and neither earned nor lost 50 cents each time they
left a problem blank. In this way, the polls that we conducted provide information about the
number of undergraduates who chose to answer each math problem, as well as information about
the number of undergraduates who thought that “a” was the correct choice and the number of
undergraduates who thought that “b” was the correct choice.6
So, for each math problem, subjects in each treatment group are first given 60 seconds to
determine what they think is the correct answer. This gives subjects an opportunity to solve the
problem and to decide whether they want to receive the results of the poll that we conducted for
that problem. If they choose to receive the poll results, then we provide them with that
information; otherwise, we do not provide them with the poll results.7 Once we give the poll
results to the subjects who choose to receive them, all subjects in the treatment groups have an
additional 60 seconds to choose an answer to the problem.8 The answer that subjects mark at the
end determines whether they earn money, lose money, or get nothing for each problem.
Although all subjects assigned to a treatment group have the option to receive the poll
results, we manipulate whether subjects may receive the poll results for free or whether they
must pay a small cost. We also manipulate whether the poll results are credible or not. This
creates four different treatment groups in a 2 x 2 factorial research design: In one treatment
group, subjects may receive poll results that they know to be credible for free. In the second
treatment group, subjects may receive poll results that they do not know to be credible for free.
In the third treatment group, subjects must pay a small cost if they would like to receive poll
results that they know to be credible. In the fourth treatment group, subjects must pay a small
cost if they would like to receive poll results that they do not know to be credible. We use a
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between-group research design in which separate groups of subjects are assigned to each of these
treatment groups and to the control group.9 Each treatment group is described below.

Treatment 1: Free Access to Credible Polls
In this treatment group, subjects can receive the polls for free. That is, all they need to do
to receive the polls is put a checkmark beside the line that asks whether they would like to
receive information about what 66 other undergraduates recommend as the correct answer. Once
subjects mark that they would like to receive this information, the experimenter provides it to
them. This aspect of this treatment group is analogous to when citizens in the real world receive
polls as a by-product of other activities and, therefore, do not pay any opportunity costs. For
example, citizens surfing the Internet may see poll results in the margins of the webpage that
they are reading or during the commercial break of the TV show that they are watching.
Further, subjects in this treatment group know that the poll results are credible. That is,
subjects are told that the 66 undergraduates that we polled earned 50 cents every time they
recommended the correct answer, lost 50 cents every time they recommended the incorrect
answer, and earned nothing if they chose not to answer the problem. Thus, subjects know that
the pollees had an incentive to answer the questions truthfully and have little reason to fear that
the pollees’ responses were not truthful. This aspect of this treatment group is analogous to the
many real world contexts in which citizens have little or no reason to fear that the pollees’
responses were not truthful. For example, real world polls showing that a majority of pollees
support clean energy policies or that a majority of pollees oppose raising property taxes are polls
that typically do not cause citizens to fear that the pollees’ responses are untruthful. Although
citizens may not base their decisions upon these polls for other reasons (namely, they may fear
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that the pollees are not knowledgeable about clean energy or property tax policies), there is little
reason for them to question whether the pollees had an incentive to be truthful. And, just as
citizens in the real world may fear that pollees lack knowledge about particular issues, so too
may subjects in our experiments fear that the pollees lack knowledge about the correct answers
to particular math problems. Thus, with this treatment group, we are able to assess the effects
that polls have on citizens when they can receive them without paying a cost and when the
pollees are credible, but not necessarily knowledgeable.10

Treatment 2: Free Access to Non-Credible Polls
In this treatment group, subjects can also receive the polls for free. However, because
citizens in the real world do not always know whether pollees are credible, we do not tell
subjects in this treatment group anything about the pollees’ incentives. Specifically, we tell these
subjects that, prior to the experiment, we asked 66 undergraduates about what they thought the
correct answers to the math problems were, and we do not tell these subjects anything about how
these undergraduates earned money.11 Thus, although the undergraduates that we polled actually
had an incentive to recommend correct answers (as described above), subjects did not know this.
This aspect of this treatment group is analogous to the many real world contexts in which
citizens may question whether pollees truthfully responded to the questions they were asked. For
example, before the 2008 presidential election, many citizens and pundits questioned whether
pollees truthfully revealed that they were going to vote for Barack Obama on Election Day or
whether the poll results were driven by the Bradley Effect. Similarly, pollsters and others often
question whether pollees truthfully report that they turned out to vote in particular elections. In
contexts such as these, citizens who receive poll results may question whether the pollees’
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responses are truthful. Similarly, subjects in this treatment group may question whether the
pollees’ responses to the math problems were truthful. Thus, with this treatment group, we are
able to assess the effects that polls have on citizens when they can receive them without paying a
cost, but when they may reasonably question whether the pollees had an incentive to respond
truthfully.12

Treatment 3: Costly Access to Credible Polls
In this treatment group, subjects must pay a small cost to receive the polls. Specifically,
subjects must pay 10 cents each time they wish to receive information about what 66 other
undergraduates recommend as the correct answer.13 This 10-cent cost is designed to be
analogous to the opportunity costs that citizens in the real world may face when they seek out
poll results.14 As in the “Free Access to Credible Polls” treatment group, subjects know that the
pollees had an incentive to recommend correct choices. That is, subjects are told that the 66
undergraduates that we polled earned 50 cents every time they recommended the correct answer,
lost 50 cents every time they recommended the incorrect answer, and earned nothing if they
chose not to answer the problem. As before, what subjects do not know is whether the pollees
were capable of solving the math problems correctly. Thus, with this treatment group, we are
able to assess the effects that polls have on citizens when they must pay a small cost to receive
polls that they know to be credible, but that are not necessarily knowledgeable.

Treatment 4: Costly Access to Non-Credible Polls
In this treatment group, subjects must also pay 10 cents each time they wish to receive
the poll results. However, as in the “Free Access to Non-Credible Polls” treatment group, we do
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not tell subjects in this treatment group anything about the pollees’ incentives. That is, we tell
these subjects that, prior to the experiment, we asked 66 undergraduates about what they thought
the correct answers to the math problems were, and we do not tell these subjects anything about
how these undergraduates earned money. Thus, with this treatment group, we are able to assess
the effects that polls have on citizens when they must pay a small cost to receive the polls and
when they may reasonably question whether the pollees had an incentive to respond truthfully.

Natural Variations: Problem Difficulty and Subject Sophistication
Because the math problems that we use vary in how difficult they are, subjects in our
treatment groups receive dramatically different poll results for each math problem. That is, the
size and direction of the majority recommending one option over the other naturally varies for
each problem, depending upon the difficulty of the problem. Specifically, on the easy math
problems, a large majority of the undergraduates that we polled recommended the correct
answer. For example, on one of the easiest math problems, 59 pollees recommended the correct
answer, 3 pollees recommended the incorrect answer, and 4 pollees chose not to answer the
problem. However, on one of the most difficult math problems, a very large majority of
undergraduates recommended the incorrect answer. For still other problems, there was not a
large majority in favor of either option; that is, these poll results are closer to a 50-50 split.
These different distributions of opinion for each math problem enable us to assess the
effects that the size and direction of the majority have on subjects’ decisions. Indeed, this natural
variation in the math problems allows us to analyze not only whether subjects in our treatment
groups base their choices upon what the majority of the pollees recommends, but also how large
this majority has to be before subjects are willing to follow it.15 And, because the poll results for

11
each math problem reflect how difficult each problem is (i.e., problems with more pollees
recommending the correct answer are easier problems than those with fewer pollees
recommending the correct answer), we are also able to assess whether subjects are more or less
likely to receive poll results when the decisions they must make are difficult versus easy.
Another natural variation that we take advantage of is subjects’ varying levels of
sophistication. Because we recruited a broad range of subjects and randomly assigned them to a
treatment or control group, we have a mix of sophisticated and unsophisticated subjects in each
treatment group and in the control group. Further, because we collect subjects’ SAT math scores
prior to the experiment,16 we have a valid and reliable measure of how sophisticated subjects are
at answering math problems. In this way, we are able to examine whether unsophisticated
subjects are more or less likely than sophisticated subjects to obtain polls.
This measure of subjects’ sophistication is another important advantage associated with
asking subjects to make decisions about math problems. Indeed, although an agreed upon
measure of political sophistication does not exist (see, e.g., Luskin 1987), there does exist an
agreed upon, widely used, and straightforward measure of mathematical sophistication. Further,
subjects’ SAT math scores provide us with a measure of sophistication that is directly related to
the task that subjects perform in our experiment (i.e., solving math problems). This also
represents an improvement upon existing research because scholars often use a measure of
sophistication that is not directly related to the task they seek to study. Specifically, scholars
frequently measure political sophistication as the ability to answer factual questions about
politics (see, e.g., Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Measures of this nature, however, may not
have a strong relationship to the tasks that subjects perform in an experiment (for example,
voting in a mock election, expressing an attitude about a particular policy, etc.) or to the tasks
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that citizens perform in the real world (i.e., voting for particular candidates or policies). By
using SAT math scores as our measure of sophistication, we are able to use a measure of
sophistication that directly relates to the task that subjects perform in our experiment.

External Validity: Connecting Math Problems to Politics
Even though math problems do not look like political decisions on the surface, they
capture many key characteristics of political decisions. Thus, they can tell us a great deal about
how citizens in the real world make political choices. At the most basic level, citizens making
political decisions often choose between two options (e.g., voting “yes” or “no” on an initiative,
voting for the incumbent or the challenger) that will have different effects on their welfare in the
future (Fowler and Kam 2006). Similarly, our subjects must choose between two options (“a” or
“b”) that also have different effects on their future welfare. Indeed, because subjects in our
experiments 1) earn money for correct choices and lose money for incorrect choices, 2) are not
paid for their decisions until the end of the experiment, and 3) are not given feedback about their
decisions until the end of the experiment, the choices they make affect their future welfare.
Although most political decisions affect citizens’ welfare (and, thus, there is something at
stake when citizens make political decisions), the stakes are often perceived to be small. Indeed,
although some citizens perceive the stakes to be large when making decisions about hot-button
political issues (such as abortion), research suggests that typical political issues are low stakes
games for most Americans (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). Thus, in our experiments, we
ensure that there is something at stake for subjects (money), but that, as in many real world
political contexts, the stakes are not large (subjects earn or lose 50 cents for each decision).
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Another similarity between making decisions about math problems and making decisions
about politics pertains to the preexisting knowledge that citizens in the real world and subjects in
our experiments possess. Specifically, in real world politics, citizens are not blank slates when
they go to the ballot box; that is, they may have preexisting knowledge about the candidates and
policies that they are choosing from. Similarly, subjects in our experiments are not blank slates
when they make their decisions about whether “a” or “b” is the best choice for them because
they may have preexisting knowledge about how to answer particular math problems.
That said, citizens in the real world might be uncertain about their decisions; that is, they
may not know which candidate or policy will make them better off. This is especially true when
party labels are not attached to the options from which voters must choose, as is the case in
nonpartisan elections, ballots containing initiatives, etc. Similarly, subjects in our experiments
may be uncertain about whether choosing “a” or “b” will make them better off. As in the real
world, the uncertainty that subjects experience depends, in part, upon their levels of
sophistication. Indeed, just as unsophisticated citizens in the real world may be more uncertain
about which choice will make them better off, so too may unsophisticated subjects in our
experiments be more uncertain about whether “a” or “b” is the best choice. And, just as citizens
in the real world vary in their levels of sophistication, so too do our subjects, as their SAT math
scores range from 400 (the 14th percentile) to 800 (a perfect score).
Further, citizens in the real world often receive poll results, and they must then make
decisions about which option will make them better off. For example, citizens may receive polls
showing that a majority of citizens support a particular candidate, and they must then decide
whether they should choose that candidate when they go to the ballot box. Similarly, subjects in
our experiments receive polls showing that a majority of undergraduates recommend a particular
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answer, and they must then make decisions about whether they should choose “a” or “b.”
Admittedly, the questions on many political polls are subjective (i.e., should abortion be legal, do
you support or oppose the war in Iraq), and we recognize that there are differences between this
type of poll and the polls used in our experiments. That said, there are many political polls that
ask objectively correct or incorrect questions. For example, a 2003 Washington Post poll asked
citizens the following questions: “How likely is it that Saddam Hussein was personally involved
in the September 11 terrorist attacks?” and “How likely is it that Saddam Hussein had already
developed weapons of mass destruction?” In contrast to more subjective opinion polls, this type
of poll contains questions about information that is objectively correct or incorrect. The polls in
our experiments are designed to be analogous to these more objective polls; thus, they tell us a
great deal about the effects that this type of poll has on citizens’ decisions.
Finally, some types of political decisions either implicitly or explicitly involve solving
math problems. For example, ballot initiatives regarding school funding policies, property tax
policies, and other economic policies often involve math problems that citizens must solve to
determine if particular policies benefit them and what the net impact of these policies is.
Similarly, evaluating politicians’ statements about the consequences of social security
privatization involves calculations about whether and when private accounts will yield a higher
rate of return than the current system. In the real world (as in our experiments), these decisions
can be difficult not only because the problem is complex, but also because poll results may not
indicate the “correct” or welfare-improving solution. Given the many similarities between real
world political decisions and decisions about math problems, there is a close mapping between
the psychological processes of subjects in our experiments and the psychological processes of
voters in real world contexts (Aronson, Wilson, and Brewer 1998).
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Hypotheses
The experiments described above yield a number of predictions about the conditions
under which subjects should be more (or less) likely to choose to receive polls. Specifically, we
expect subjects to be more likely to receive polls when they can receive them for free, as
opposed to when they must pay a cost, all else constant. Thus, subjects should be more likely to
receive polls when they are free and credible than when they are costly and credible. Subjects
should also be more likely to receive polls when they are free and non-credible than when they
are costly and non-credible. We also predict that subjects will be more likely to receive polls
when they know the polls are credible, as opposed to non-credible, all else constant. Thus,
subjects should be more likely to receive polls when they are free and credible than when they
are free and non-credible. Subjects should also be more likely to receive polls when they are
costly and credible than when they are costly and non-credible. Further, we expect subjects to be
more likely to receive polls when they are unsophisticated (as opposed to sophisticated) and
when the problems are difficult (as opposed to easy).
The logic behind each of these predictions is straightforward. When receiving polls is
costly, the cost of the polls may exceed their value for some subjects. This is not the case when
subjects can receive polls for free. Further, when subjects know that the polls are credible, the
perceived quality of that information is higher than when the polls are not known to be credible.
Thus, all else constant, subjects should be more likely to receive credible polls than non-credible
polls. Additionally, unsophisticated subjects (who typically lack the ability to make correct
decisions on their own) are more likely to need the information that polls provide, and subjects,
in the aggregate, are more likely to need polling information when the decisions are more
difficult. Stated differently, subjects who can make correct decisions on their own (either
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because they are sophisticated or because the problem is easy) should be less likely to receive
polls, all else constant.
As for how polls should affect the quality of subjects’ decisions once they choose to
receive them, this depends upon subjects’ beliefs about the sophistication levels of the 66
undergraduates that we polled, relative to their self-evaluations of their own levels of
sophistication. For example, if a subject believes that the 66 undergraduates that we polled are
more sophisticated than he or she is, then that subject should base his or her decision on what the
majority of pollees recommends, especially if the poll is known to be credible. If a subject
believes that the 66 pollees are less sophisticated than he or she is, then that subject should
ignore the poll results if the majority recommends an answer that differs from his or her own
perceptions of the correct answer. Because subjects are not told whether the undergraduates that
we polled are knowledgeable about solving math problems, we must simply observe ex post the
quality of their decisions in each treatment group, with correct versus incorrect poll results, and
with different margins between the number of pollees recommending one answer over the other.

Data and Methodology
To test our hypotheses, we conducted laboratory experiments at a large public university.
When recruiting subjects, we posted flyers on campus and sent out campus-wide emails to
advertise the experiments. A total of 236 adults who were enrolled in undergraduate classes
participated. Of these 236 subjects, 42 were randomly assigned to the “Free Access to Credible
Polls” treatment group, 49 were assigned to the “Free Access to Non-Credible Polls” group, 37
were assigned to the “Costly Access to Credible Polls” group, 42 were assigned to the “Costly
Access to Non-Credible Polls” group, and 66 were assigned to the control group.
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When analyzing the data gleaned from these experiments, we first assess whether and
when subjects choose to receive polls. Specifically, we estimate the following model:
ReceivePoll = α + β Treatment1 + β Treatment2 + β Treatment3 + β Sophistication +
β Difficulty + β SchoolYear + β Female + є
In this model, ReceivePoll is a dummy variable that reflects whether a subject chooses to receive
a poll on each problem (coded 1 if a subject chooses to receive a poll and 0 otherwise). The
Treatment1 variable reflects participation in Treatment group 1 (i.e., where polls are available,
free, and credible) and is coded 1 if a subject is in Treatment group 1 and 0 otherwise. The
Treatment2 variable reflects participation in Treatment group 2 (i.e., where polls are available,
free, and not credible) and is coded 1 if a subject is in Treatment group 2 and 0 otherwise. The
Treatment3 variable reflects participation in Treatment group 3 (i.e., where polls are available,
costly, and credible) and is coded 1 if a subject is in Treatment group 3 and 0 otherwise. The
Sophistication variable reflects subjects’ SAT math scores, and the Difficulty variable indicates
the level of difficulty of each math problem (higher values of this variable reflect a harder
problem). The variables SchoolYear and Female indicate subjects’ year in school and gender,
respectively.17 Treatment group 4 (where polls are available, costly, and not credible) is the
omitted category in this regression.
We estimate the above model using a logistic regression and a random effects logistic
regression. We include a random effects model to capture unobserved individual (i.e., subject)
heterogeneity and to demonstrate that our results do not change when such unobserved
individual heterogeneity is modeled. Substantively, this analysis enables us to assess whether
subjects are more likely to receive polls when the decisions they must make are difficult and
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when they are more (or less) sophisticated. It also allows us to analyze whether subjects are
more (or less) likely to receive polls in particular treatment groups.
Second, we assess whether and when polls help subjects to improve their decisions and,
by extension, their welfare. Because subjects earn money for each correct decision, lose money
for each incorrect decision, and neither earn nor lose money for each blank answer, we use the
amount of money that each subject earns on each problem as a measure of the quality of
subjects’ decisions.18 Specifically, we estimate the following model:
MoneyEarned = α + β Treatment1 + β Treatment2 + β Treatment3 + β Treatment4 +
β Sophistication + β Difficulty + β ReceivePoll*Treatment1 +
β ReceivePoll*Treatment2 + β ReceivePoll*Treatment3 +
β ReceivePoll*Treatment4 + β ReceivePoll*Sophistication +
β ReceivePoll*Difficulty + β ReceivePoll*MajorityMargin +
β ReceivePoll*MajorityIncorrect + β SchoolYear + β Female + є
In this model, MoneyEarned is a variable that reflects the amount of money that a subject earns
on each problem (coded $0.50 if a subject answers correctly, $-0.50 if a subject answers
incorrectly, and $0 if a subject leaves the problem blank).19 Thus, our unit of analysis is subjectproblem observations.20 The Treatment1, Treatment2, Treatment3, Treatment4, Sophistication,
and Difficulty variables are coded as described above. We also interact each of these variables
with a ReceivePoll dummy variable (coded 1 if a subject chooses to receive a poll and 0
otherwise). We also include an interaction between ReceivePoll and a MajorityIncorrect dummy
variable (coded 1 if a majority of pollees recommend the incorrect answer and 0 otherwise), as
well as an interaction between ReceivePoll and a MajorityMargin variable (which reflects the
absolute value of the difference between the number of pollees choosing “a” versus “b”). As in
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the previous model, we control for subjects’ year in school and gender. The omitted category in
this model is the control group.
The main variables of interest in this analysis are the interaction terms because they
capture the effects of receiving polls under different conditions. Specifically, significant positive
coefficients for the interactions between ReceivePoll and each treatment dummy variable would
indicate that receiving polls improves subjects’ decisions within a given treatment group. A
significant negative coefficient for the interaction between ReceivePoll and MajorityIncorrect
would indicate that receiving incorrect poll results induces subjects to make worse decisions. A
significant positive coefficient for the interaction between ReceivePoll and MajorityMargin
would indicate that the larger the majority picking one option (in this case, the correct option)
over the other, the better decisions subjects make. We estimate this model using both ordinary
least squares (OLS) and random effects generalized least squares (GLS) regressions21 to ensure
that our results are robust to unobserved individual heterogeneity.

Results: The Blind Lead the Blind
Our results show that subjects are more likely to receive polls when the polls are least
likely to help them. Specifically, Table 1 demonstrates that subjects are more likely to receive
polls when the decisions that they must make are more difficult. Indeed, as shown in Table 2,
moving from the easiest problem in the experiment (which 89% of the pollees answered
correctly) to the hardest problem (which only 6% of the pollees answered correctly) increases the
chance that subjects choose to receive a poll by approximately 16%.22 Although this result is not
surprising (indeed, we did not expect subjects to choose to receive polls when the decisions that
they must make are easy), it is quite ironic because the hardest problems in the experiment are
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the ones where the pollees are less likely to recommend the correct answer. Thus, subjects are
more likely to choose to receive polls in situations where their fellow undergraduates are also
uninformed about the correct choice.
[Tables 1 and 2 about here]
As expected, we also find that unsophisticated subjects are more likely to choose to
receive polls than are sophisticated subjects. Specifically, Table 2 shows that moving from the
most sophisticated subject (who scored an 800 on his or her SAT math test) to the least
sophisticated subject (who scored a 400 on his or her SAT math test) increases the chance that
subjects will receive a poll by 29%. Although it is also not surprising that the least sophisticated
are more likely to choose to receive polls, these results demonstrate that the blind lead the blind
in our experiments. Indeed, these results indicate that subjects who lack the sophistication to
judge whether the polls are correct are the ones who are more likely to receive them, even when
their fellow undergraduates are unlikely to know any more than they do.
Contrary to our expectations, the results in Tables 1 and 2 also demonstrate that subjects
are equally likely to receive polls when the poll results are credible versus non-credible. That is,
although subjects are significantly more likely to choose to receive polls when it is free to
receive them (compared to when they must pay a cost), there is not a significant difference in the
probability that subjects choose to receive polls when 1) the poll results are free and credible
versus free and non-credible and 2) the poll results are costly and credible versus costly and noncredible. Thus, regardless of whether polls are free or costly, subjects are just as likely to choose
to receive polls when they know that the pollees had a financial incentive to recommend correct
choices versus when they do not know anything about the pollees’ incentives. Thus, not only do
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the “blind” pollees lead the “blind” subjects, but subjects also do not appear to distinguish
between credible and non-credible polls.23

Consequences of Receiving Polls
Our results also demonstrate that polls do not necessarily help subjects to improve their
decisions. Specifically, when we compare subjects in the control group to subjects who receive
the polls in each treatment group, we do not observe any significant differences in the amounts
of money that subjects earn. Indeed, Tables 3 and 4 show that subjects who receive the polls in
each treatment group do no better than subjects in the control group, who make their decisions
on their own. This finding stems, in part, from the fact that treatment group subjects who receive
the polls do not appear to distinguish between correct and incorrect poll results, nor do they take
into account the size of the majority recommending one answer over the other. That is, the
direction of the majority (regardless of whether it is correct or incorrect) exerts an enormous
influence on subjects’ decisions, while the size of the majority does not.
[Tables 3 and 4 about here]
The results in Table 4 illustrate the power that the direction (but not the size) of the
majority has on subjects’ decisions. Specifically, we find that when a majority of the pollees
recommended the correct answer, subjects who receive polls earn significantly more money than
subjects in the control group. However, when a majority of the pollees recommended the
incorrect answer, subjects who receive polls earn significantly less money than subjects in the
control group. Indeed, when the direction of the majority changes from recommending the
correct answer to recommending the incorrect answer, subjects who receive the polls lose an
estimated 43 cents per problem. Interestingly, Table 4 also demonstrates that the size of the
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majority recommending one answer over the other does not influence subjects’ decisions. That
is, moving from the smallest majority margin (where 6 pollees recommended one answer and 5
recommended the other answer, yielding a margin of 1) to the largest majority margin (where 59
pollees recommended one answer and 3 recommended the other answer, yielding a margin of 56)
does not produce a significant difference in the amounts of money that subjects earn. This result
holds regardless of whether the majority recommends the correct or incorrect answer24 and even
when controlling for the difficulty of the problems. Thus, even though the size of the majority
may not be very large and even though a bare majority may recommend the incorrect answer, the
direction of the majority exerts a significant influence on subjects’ decisions.
Because subjects’ decisions to receive polls are not random (the results in Tables 1 and 2
show that they are not), we also conducted experiments in which all subjects were automatically
given free and credible polls (as opposed to having to request them). We then compared the
results of these experiments with the results from our “Free Access to Credible Polls” treatment
group (where subjects choose whether to receive free and credible polls).25 This comparison
allows us to determine whether polls have the same effect on subjects’ decisions when subjects
choose to receive them versus when they are forced to receive them (see Gaines and Kuklinski
2008, 2009 for further discussion of the advantages of this technique). Our results indicate that
regardless of whether subjects choose to receive these polls or whether they are automatically
given the polls, the effects that these polls have on their decisions are the same. That is, in both
experiments, the direction of the majority exerts a large influence on subjects’ decisions, while
the size of the majority does not. Thus, even when subjects are automatically given polls, they
earn significantly less money when a majority of pollees recommends the incorrect decision,
regardless of the size of that majority. (See the web appendix for these results.)
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Conclusion
The results of our experiments demonstrate that when it comes to polls, “the blind lead
the blind.” That is, subjects are more likely to obtain polls when the decisions that they must
make are difficult and when they are unsophisticated. Although this result makes a great deal of
sense (i.e., we expect subjects to seek information when they are not sure of what choice to
make), it is problematic because on the difficult decisions, the pollees are also uninformed and
do not provide much useful information. Thus, we observe the blind pollees leading the blind
subjects. Further, subjects do not appear to distinguish between credible versus non-credible
polls.
Our results also show that polls do not necessarily help subjects to improve their
decisions. Specifically, we find that although subjects base their decisions upon the
recommendations of the majority, they do not distinguish between correct and incorrect poll
results, nor do they take into account the size of the majority recommending one answer over the
other. That is, the direction of the majority (regardless of whether it is correct) exerts an
enormous influence on subjects’ decisions, while the size of the majority does not. What this
means for subjects’ decisions is that when a majority of pollees recommends the correct answer,
subjects who receive the polls make significantly better decisions than subjects in the control
group, who make their decisions on their own. However, when a majority of pollees
recommends the incorrect answer, subjects who receive polls make significantly worse decisions
than subjects in the control group. These effects occur regardless of the size of the majority
recommending one answer over the other. Thus, the majority’s opinions about the correct
choices can cause subjects to make incorrect decisions, even when the majority is not very large.
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The consequence of these findings is that subjects who receive the polls in each treatment group
make decisions that are no better than the decisions of control group subjects.
Because polls are increasingly conducted by politicians and reported in the media (and
because poll results are not always correct), our results contribute to the literature on polls, in
particular, and to the literature on cue-taking, in general. Although many scholars suggest that
cues improve citizens’ decisions, our results reveal that the effectiveness of this particular cue
depends upon the nature of the poll results. That is, although polls are clearly a powerful cue for
citizens,26 they only help citizens to improve their decisions when a majority of pollees is in
favor of the correct choice. And, because our results suggest that citizens are more likely to
obtain polls when the poll results are least likely to help them (i.e., when the decisions are
difficult and when they are unsophisticated), it cannot be said that polls necessarily provide
citizens with cues that help them with their decisions. Indeed, what this result suggests for real
world politics is that when unsophisticated citizens receive polls about what their fellow citizens
think about complex, difficult issues (such as how to properly dispose of nuclear waste or what
the consequences of social security privatization would be), they are unlikely to benefit from
such poll results. Rather, their fellow citizens are likely to be just as uninformed about these
issues as they are, which may lead citizens to make worse decisions than they would have made
on their own. However, when citizens receive polls about what their fellow citizens think about
simpler issues, they are more likely to receive poll results that help them with their decisions.
The irony is that when the issues are simple, citizens are unlikely to need polls in the first place.
Viewed in light of the media’s (over)emphasis on the precision of polls, as well as the
problems associated with telephone and Internet polls, our results suggest that we have good
reason to fear that “the blind lead the blind” in real world politics. Consistent with our
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experimental results, survey-based and historical research demonstrates that citizens in real
world political settings put a tremendous amount of stock in what “the majority” thinks, feels,
and intends to do (Herbst 1993; Igo 2007). The stock that ordinary citizens put in polls is
disconcerting because scholars have shown that real world polls can be inaccurate and biased
(see, e.g., Franklin 2003; Jackman 2005; Lau 1994). Thus, citizens in real world politics (like
subjects in our experiments) may receive poll results that are inaccurate, yet may be swayed by
these seemingly precise and scientific results.
From a methodological standpoint, our results suggest that scholars should continue to
use both experimental and survey-based methods to investigate the effects that polls have on
citizens’ decisions. In this study, we took advantage of the strong internal validity associated
with laboratory experiments and analyzed 1) the conditions under which citizens are willing to
obtain polls and 2) whether and when polls help citizens to improve their decisions. However,
because we examined the effects of one particular type of poll (i.e., polls about objectively
correct or incorrect information), our results may overestimate the extent to which citizens in the
real world base their decisions upon the recommendations of the majority. Indeed, Griskevicius
et al. (2006) demonstrate that when an issue has an objectively correct answer, people are more
likely to follow the majority out of fear of being proven wrong. Although many political polls
contain information that is objectively correct or incorrect (i.e., whether Saddam Hussein was
personally involved in the September 11 terrorist attacks), other political polls contain more
subjective questions (i.e., whether respondents support or oppose the war in Iraq). Thus,
scholars should be cautious when generalizing our results to more subjective polling contexts.
That said, given the many polls that do tap pollees’ beliefs about objective, factual information,
our experiments tell us a great deal about how citizens in the real world use this type of poll.
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Further, because we focused on one particular cue, our study leaves open the question of
which cues are most effective for different citizens in different contexts. Specifically, citizens in
the real world may use not only poll results, but also other cues (such as endorsements and party
labels) when making political decisions. Additionally, citizens’ decisions to use particular cues
(as well as the number of cues they use) may depend on whether they are more or less
sophisticated and whether the decisions they must make are difficult versus easy. Thus, we
emphasize that future research should examine whether citizens use more than one cue when
making decisions, as well as which cues they choose to use in different contexts.
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1

Igo (2007) describes how the media has historically presented poll results in a way that makes

them seem more precise than they really are. She emphasizes that the media often summarizes
complicated poll results in simplistic charts or short broadcasts that gloss over nuances and
variability in the polling data. She also describes the media’s tendency to present poll results in a
way that makes it appear as though the public speaks in one voice, when in reality they do not (p.
143). Igo then details pollsters’ efforts to persuade members of the media to present a more
realistic account of how the public feels about particular issues. Herbst (1993) also notes that the
media often provides an uncritical reporting of poll results and does not always properly
communicate complex findings.
2

Subjects are given 60 seconds to make a decision about each math problem because we found

that subjects tend not to use longer amounts of time. Specifically, when pretesting these math
problems for other experiments, we allowed subjects to have a longer amount of time (i.e., 90
seconds) to answer each problem. In these pretests, we discovered that subjects tend not to use
this extra time, but rather sit there for the last 30 seconds, appearing quite bored and restless.
Further, giving subjects 90 seconds to answer each math problem would make our experiments
last even longer, which we knew from experience would tax subjects’ attention spans.
3

Lau and Redlawsk (1997) develop measures that assess the correctness of citizens’ votes.

4

Allowing the pollees to leave problems blank most likely prompts subjects to confer greater

expertise on the majority. This is especially true if subjects believe that the pollees who do not
know the correct answers are the ones who leave the problems blank.
5

Importantly, we tell subjects in our treatment groups that these undergraduates had 60 seconds

to make a decision about each math problem.
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6

The math problems that subjects solve were chosen based upon the poll results that we obtained

for each problem. That is, we included some math problems where a majority of pollees
recommended the correct answer, some where a majority of pollees recommended the incorrect
answer, and some where the poll results were closer to a 50-50 split. We also included problems
that varied in how large the majority recommending the correct or incorrect answer was.
7

In each session of each treatment group, there are between 12 and 14 subjects in the laboratory.

To ensure that subjects’ decisions to receive polls are not driven by stigmas or social desirability
effects, we use several procedures. Specifically, all subjects sit behind large partitions so that
they cannot see whether other subjects choose to receive the poll results on particular math
problems. Additionally, subjects indicate whether they want to receive the poll results by
checking “yes” or “no” on their handouts. Then, we collect all subjects’ handouts to determine
whether any subjects want to receive the poll results. If a subject chooses to receive the poll
results, then we write the poll results for that problem on that subject’s handout. Otherwise, we
leave subjects’ handouts blank. Regardless of how many subjects choose to receive the poll
results, we take approximately one minute to write the poll results on subjects’ handouts. We do
this so that subjects cannot infer anything about how many other subjects chose to receive the
poll results from the amount of time that it takes us to write the poll results on subjects’
handouts. After we write down the poll results, we return the handouts to all of the subjects; that
is, subjects either receive a blank handout or a handout containing the poll results, depending on
what they chose. We do this so that subjects cannot infer which subjects (or how many subjects)
chose to receive the poll results. Given the anonymity of subjects’ decisions, we are confident
that stigmas or social desirability effects do not confound our experiments and that our results
would be no different if our experiment had been computerized.
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8

Non-treatment group participants make one 60-second decision about the answer to each math

problem. Equating the total amount of time that these groups have to make their decisions would
have required us to do one of two things. First, we could have given non-treatment group
participants a longer amount of time to answer each problem (i.e., 120 seconds). However, when
pretesting these problems, we found that students tend not to use longer amounts of time. Thus,
we are confident that our results would be the same if we had equated the groups by giving nontreatment group participants a full 120 seconds to make each decision. Second, we could have
given treatment group subjects less time (after the initial 60 seconds) to make their final decision
about each problem (for example, 15 seconds instead of an additional 60 seconds). To equate the
groups in this way, we could have given non-treatment group participants a total of 75 seconds to
make their decisions. We did not do this because we feared that giving treatment group subjects
only 15 seconds to make their final decisions would have limited our ability to draw conclusions
about real world polls and behavior. Indeed, research shows that people are more likely to use
mental shortcuts when time is limited. Thus, we ensured that treatment group subjects had
ample time to make their decisions after receiving the polls and that they did not feel rushed (or
forced to rely upon the polls) when making their decisions. Given these considerations, we
purposely did not equate the groups with respect to the total amount of time they had to make
their decisions.
9

A between-group research design enables us to use the same math problems in each group.

That said, in some sessions of the experiment, we had treatment group subjects answer 18 math
problems, while in other sessions, we had treatment group subjects answer only ten or eleven of
these problems. To account for any differences in the difficulty of the problems across groups,
we control for the difficulty of the problems in our statistical analyses.
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10

If the pollees had both a financial incentive to recommend correct answers and the expertise

needed to recommend correct answers, we expect that subjects would rely even more heavily on
the poll results. Indeed, Lupia and McCubbins (1998) demonstrate that when citizens perceive
others to be both knowledgeable and trustworthy, they base their decisions upon the information
that they provide. We did not use pollees who were both knowledgeable and trustworthy in our
experiments because real world pollees are not always both knowledgeable and trustworthy.
Further, if we had surveyed 66 math experts and paid them for recommending correct answers,
we would not have had nearly as much variation in the poll results. That is, few (if any) polls
would have indicated the incorrect decision or been close to a 50-50 split. Because we are
interested in how variations in the size and direction of the majority affect decisions, we did not
survey math experts. This is also why we did not conduct experiments in which the pollees were
math experts, but did not have a financial incentive to recommend correct answers. That is, we
suspected that math experts (who seem to pride themselves on knowing the correct answers)
would recommend the correct answers regardless of whether they were paid for doing so.
11

To guard against the possibility that subjects would simply assume that the 66 undergraduates

that we polled were paid for recommending the correct answer, we use two different procedures.
First, at the beginning of the experiment, we ask subjects to solve four math problems on their
own. For two of these math problems, we tell subjects that they will earn money for choosing
correct answers. On the other two problems, we tell subjects that they will earn money for
choosing incorrect answers. By doing this, we show subjects that the 66 undergraduates that we
polled did not necessarily earn money for recommending correct answers. Second, we give
subjects a quiz on the instructions that we read at the beginning of the experiment, and one of the
quiz questions asks subjects about how the 66 undergraduates that we polled earned money. The
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correct answer to this quiz question is “unknown,” and subjects, by and large, answer this quiz
question correctly. This gives us confidence that subjects are not simply assuming that the 66
undergraduates were paid for recommending correct answers.
12

For a study showing that the absence of financial incentives can make citizens less likely to

provide correct political information, see Prior and Lupia (2008).
13

This 10-cent cost is subtracted from subjects’ experimental earnings at the end of the

experiment, and all subjects know this at the outset of the experiment.
14

This 10-cent cost most likely underestimates the opportunity costs that citizens face in the real

world. We designed our experiments in this way because if citizens are unwilling to receive
polls with only a 10-cent cost—which is a small cost, relative to the potential benefit (50 cents)
that subjects will achieve if they make a correct choice—then it is unlikely that they will do so in
the real world, when they may spend time, energy, and attention that is more costly to them,
relative to what they might gain. Further, given that subjects’ expected payoff from guessing
about the correct answer to a math problem is zero (50% x $0.50 + 50% x -$0.50 = 0), subjects
only need to believe that a poll will increase their probability of answering the problem correctly
by 11% (i.e. from 50% to 61%) for them to rationally pay 10 cents to receive it (61% x $0.50 +
39% x -$0.50 = 11 cents).
15

For an overview of the social psychology literature on social influence and majority influence,

see Cialdini and Goldstein (2004) and Martin, Gardikiotis, and Hewstone (2002).
16

Subjects self-report their SAT math scores. Thus, we took a number of precautions to reduce

(if not eliminate) subjects’ incentive to inflate or misrepresent their SAT math scores.
Specifically, we made sure that subjects were not told that the experiment involved solving math
problems until the experiment actually began. Also, subjects were asked to provide all of their

32

SAT and SAT II scores (not just their SAT math scores) before the experiment took place.
Further, it was made clear to subjects that they did not need to score above a certain number on
any of the tests to participate. Subjects were also encouraged to contact the College Board, the
registrar, their parents, or their high school counselors if they did not remember their scores, and
they were given ample time to do this. We have evidence that many subjects contacted these
people, as several subjects gave us their actual score reports, and others referenced their parents
or high school counselors as having located these scores. As an ex post check on the validity of
subjects’ self-reported SAT math scores, we compared the distribution of our subjects’ SAT
math scores with the distribution of SAT math scores at the university that subjects attend.
These two distributions are quite similar. That is, the university’s 25th-75th percentile for SAT
math scores ranges from 600-700 points, while the 25th-75th percentile for SAT math scores in
our experiments ranges from 610-710 points. Further, anecdotal evidence indicates that subjects
were quite truthful when reporting their SAT scores. For example, many subjects apologized for
their low test scores and lamented the fact that these scores prevented them from attending other
universities. Others told us that they could not locate their test scores before the experiment and
asked to be rescheduled for an experiment at a later date. Taken together, this evidence gives us
much confidence that the self-reported SAT math scores are not systematically inflated or
misrepresented. There may be random noise in the scores, but this should bias us against finding
significant effects with respect to subjects’ levels of sophistication.
17

We control for these characteristics of subjects because there were small differences in them

across our treatment groups.
18

We use this dependent variable because it reflects the quality of each subject’s decision on

individual problems. We do not use a binary dependent variable that is coded “1” if a subject
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makes a correct decision on each problem and “0” if a subject makes an incorrect decision
because it does not take into account the fact that subjects can (and do) leave problems blank.
Similarly, a binary dependent variable that is coded “1” if a subject makes a correct decision on
each problem and “0” if a subject makes an incorrect decision or leaves the problem blank treats
blank and incorrect answers equally. There is an important distinction between leaving problems
blank and answering problems incorrectly, and our money earned dependent variable nicely
captures this distinction.
That said, we did create a trichotomous dependent variable that treats correct, incorrect,
and blank answers as separate categories. Specifically, we created a dependent variable that is
coded “1” if a subject answers a problem incorrectly, “2” if a subject leaves a problem blank, and
“3” if a subject answers a problem correctly. We then estimated an ordered logit regression
using this dependent variable instead of our money earned dependent variable. The substantive
results of this regression are the same as those from the money earned regression (see p. 2 of the
web appendix). From a substantive standpoint, we report the money earned results in the text
because we are interested in the effects that receiving polls has on subjects’ welfare, which
money earned nicely captures.
19

Of the 3,191 choices included in our money earned regressions, subjects earn 50 cents 1,760

times, lose 50 cents 551 times, and earn nothing 880 times.
20

The number of observations listed in Table 1 reflects 170 subjects making decisions about

whether to receive polls on 10 to 18 different math problems each, for a total of 2327 choices.
The number of observations listed in Table 3 reflects 218 subjects making decisions about the
answers to 10 to 18 different math problems each, for a total of 3191 choices. There are fewer
observations in Table 1 because control group subjects are not included in that regression. There
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are 218 subjects in the model in Table 3 because some control group subjects did not provide
demographic data, such as their year in school or gender. Our results do not change when these
demographic variables are dropped and all control group subjects are included.
21

We estimate a random effects GLS model (as opposed to a random effects OLS model)

because when individual effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors (as is the case in our
data), OLS is inefficient compared to GLS. As Greene (2003, p. 301) states, “under the
hypothesis of no correlation [between individual effects and the other regressors], both
OLS…and GLS are consistent, but OLS is inefficient.”
22

Using Treatment 4 as the omitted category does not affect the size or significance of the

effects that Difficulty and Sophistication have on the probability that subjects choose to receive
polls.
23

Subjects in the “Costly Access to Credible Polls” treatment group are not less likely to follow

the poll results once they choose to receive them. Indeed, regardless of whether subjects pay a
cost to receive credible or non-credible polls, there is little difference in the rate at which they
answer the problem correctly, incorrectly, or leave it blank.
24

One might expect the size of the majority to matter less when the problems are more difficult.

Specifically, it is plausible that when the problems are more difficult (and when subjects are
more uncertain about the correct answer), subjects may be more likely to use the mental shortcut,
“go with the majority.” However, we find that the size of the majority has roughly the same
effect on difficult and easy problems.
25

In an ideal world, we would have been able to include several different treatment groups in

which subjects are forced to view polls. For example, in an ideal world, we could force subjects
to pay a cost to receive polls that are either credible or not and force them to receive free polls
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that are either credible or not. This would allow us to have 4 different treatment groups where
subjects are forced to receive polls that correspond to each of our 4 different selection treatment
groups. Unfortunately, our Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) would not allow us to force
subjects to pay to receive polls (whether they are credible or not) because it is unethical to force
subjects to give up money in an experiment. Because we cannot force subjects to pay to receive
polls (and because we observed no differences between free, credible polls and free, non-credible
polls), we include one treatment group where subjects are forced to receive polls that are free and
credible. We find no differences in the effects of MajorityIncorrect and MajorityMargin on
subjects that are forced to receive free, credible polls and subjects that choose to receive free,
credible polls. These results give us great confidence that our results are not biased by selection
effects, and as Gaines and Kuklinski (2008, 2009) note, this is the appropriate empirical strategy
for comparing treatment effects with selection effects.
26

Our research is related to, yet different from, Surowiecki (2004). In contrast to Surowiecki,

we focus on contexts in which the majority is wrong, which leads citizens to make worse
decisions than they would have made on their own. Of course, Surowiecki also considers
instances in which the majority is wrong, and he suggests that groups arrive at bad judgments
when there is not enough variance in thought process and private information among group
members. Such homogeneity among group members may explain why the majority of pollees in
our experiments did not always recommend the correct answer. Surowiecki also emphasizes that
the sharing of information among group members is crucial for good decision making. However,
in our experiments, the pollees were not permitted to access or share information prior to
recommending an answer.
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Table 1. The Effects that Sophistication, Decision Difficulty, and each Treatment have on
Subjects’ Decisions to Receive the Poll Results
Independent Variables

Treatment 1
(free, credible polls)

Dependent Variable =
Whether Each Subject Chooses to Receive Poll
Results on Each Problem
Random Effects Logit
Logit
4.282*
3.015*
(0.401)
(0.159)

Treatment 2
(free, non-credible polls)

5.238*
(0.595)

3.313*
(0.191)

Treatment 3
(costly, credible polls)

0.390
(0.377)

0.251
(0.165)

Sophistication

-0.005*
(0.002)

-0.004*
(0.001)

Difficulty

0.023*
(0.002)

0.016*
(0.002)

Year in school

0.271*
(0.122)

0.131*
(0.055)

Female

0.288
(0.392)

-0.068
(0.119)

Constant

1.632
(1.331)

1.705*
(0.527)

rho
Log likelihood
N=
Groups (i.e., subjects) =

0.562
-876.08
2327
170

--1108.73
2327
--

Omitted category = Treatment 4 (costly, non-credible polls)
Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05
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Table 2. The Effects that Sophistication, Decision Difficulty and each Treatment have on the
Likelihood that Subjects Choose to Receive Polls
Change in
Probability of
Receiving Poll
(confidence interval)

When this variable…

Shifts from … to …

Treatment 1

0 to 1
(i.e., from “Costly Access to
Non-Credible Polls” to “Free
Access to Credible Polls”)

0.64
(0.587, 0.680)

Treatment 2

0 to 1
(i.e., from “Costly Access to
Non-Credible Polls” to “Free
Access to Non-Credible Polls”)

0.68
(0.627, 0.726)

Treatment 3

0 to 1
(i.e., from “Costly Access to
Non-Credible Polls” to “Costly
Access to Credible Polls”)

0.04
(-0.012, 0.087)

Difficulty

Easiest to Hardest

0.16
(0.122, 0.208)

Sophistication

800 to 400

0.29
(0.192, 0.404)

Effects indicate first differences with all treatment variables set to zero and all other variables
held constant at their median values. Boldface indicates that the 95% confidence interval around
a simulated first difference did not contain zero, signifying statistical significance. Based on the
Logit model presented in Table 1, with first differences drawn from 1000 simulations performed
by CLARIFY (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003).
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Table 3. Determinants of the Amount of Money Subjects Earn*
Independent Variables

Treatment 1
(free, credible polls)
Treatment 2
(free, non-credible polls)
Treatment 3
(costly, credible polls)
Treatment 4
(costly, non-credible polls)
Sophistication
Difficulty
Receive Poll x Treatment 1
Receive Poll x Treatment 2
Receive Poll x Treatment 3
Receive Poll x Treatment 4
Receive Poll x Sophistication
Receive Poll x Difficulty
Receive Poll x Majority Margin
Receive Poll x Majority Incorrect
Year in school
Female
Constant
rho
R2
N=
Groups (i.e., subjects)=

Dependent Variable = Amount of Money that
Each Subject Earns on Each Problem
Random Effects GLS
0.104*
(0.032)
0.098*
(0.037)
0.071*
(0.024)
0.072*
(0.024)
0.001*
(0.000)
-0.006*
(0.000)

OLS Model
0.108*
(0.027)
0.104*
(0.033)
0.074*
(0.019)
0.072*
(0.020)
0.001*
(0.000)
-0.006*
(0.000)

0.036
(0.111)
0.024
(0.132)
0.048
(0.103)
0.064
(0.111)
-0.000*
(0.000)
0.000
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.431*
(0.028)

0.053
(0.098)
0.038
(0.102)
0.067
(0.090)
0.086
(0.098)
-0.001*
(0.000)
0.000
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.432*
(0.028)

-0.006
(0.007)
-0.016
(0.014)
-0.084
(0.087)
0.043
0.423
3191
218

-0.006
(0.005)
-0.016
(0.011)
-0.106
(0.072)
-0.423
3191
--

Omitted category = Control group; Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.05
*We did not include a main effect for Receive Poll because subjects can only receive polls if
they are in one of the treatment groups. Note also that we estimated these models with a threeway interaction between Receive Poll, Majority Margin, and Majority Incorrect. The results
reported in this table and in the text do not change when this additional interaction is included.

Table 4. How the Treatments and Poll Characteristics Change the Amount of Money
Earned

When subjects shift from…to…, all else constant

Change in Money Earned
(confidence interval)

Control group to Receiving Polls in Treatment 1
(i.e., “Free Access to Credible Polls”)

$0.16
(-0.009, 0.348)

Control group to Receiving Polls in Treatment 2
(i.e., “Free Access to Non-Credible Polls”)

$0.15
(-0.033, 0.330)

Control group to Receiving Polls in Treatment 3
(i.e., “Costly Access to Credible Polls”)

$0.14
(-0.022, 0.328)

Control group to Receiving Polls in Treatment 4
(i.e., “Costly Access to Non-Credible Polls”)

$0.16
(-0.020, 0.354)

Receiving Poll with a Margin of 1 to Receiving Poll
with a Margin of 56*

- $0.06
(-0.168, 0.036)

Receiving Correct Poll to Receiving Incorrect Poll

- $0.43
(-0.489, -0.374)

Effects indicate first differences with all treatment variables set to zero and all other
variables held constant at their median values. Boldface indicates that the 95%
confidence interval around a simulated first difference did not contain zero, signifying
statistical significance. Based on the OLS model reported in Table 3, with first
differences drawn from 1000 simulations performed by CLARIFY (Tomz, Wittenberg,
and King 2003).
*Note that when the majority margin shifts from 1 to 56, the variable Receive Poll x
Majority Incorrect is set to zero (i.e., the poll is correct). We also find an insignificant
effect of majority margin when Receive Poll x Majority Incorrect is set to one (i.e., the
poll is incorrect).

